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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1234 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONY HOPSON, 
 
 
 
                                                
    Appellant 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(Crim. No. 2-08-cr-00216-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Alan N. Bloch 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 24, 2011 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, Circuit Judge and  
STEARNS,∗ District Judge 
 
(Opinion Filed:  February 11, 2011) 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
Anthony Hopson appeals the district court’s order of judgment of conviction and 
sentence.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
    
I. BACKGROUND1 
 
∗ Honorable Richard G. Stearns, District Court Judge, United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
 Hopson raises four arguments on appeal.  He claims that: (1) the district court 
violated his Fifth Amendment right not to testify when it instructed the jury that it could 
consider “any statements omitted by the defendant”; (2) the evidence was insufficient to 
convict; (3) the unavailability of the government’s confidential informant violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses; and (4) the district court was unreasonable 
in finding that he did not qualify as a career offender yet then varying upward based upon 
career offender factors.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.We review t
district court’s decision regarding jury instructions for abuse of discretion.  We “order a 
new trial on account of a district court’s refusal to give a proposed jury instruction ‘only 
when the requested instruction was correct, not substantially covered by the instructions 
given, and was so consequential that the refusal to give the instruction was prejudicial to 
the defendant.’ ”  United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 167 (3d Cir. 2008). 
he 
hether 
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Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence place “a very heavy burden” on an 
appellant.  United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  In reviewing such challenges, we view all of the 
evidence on the record “in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine w
any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt[] beyond a reasonable doubt base
on the available evidence.”  United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).   
Finally, absent legal error, we review a sentence for reasonableness to ensure that it
 
 
1 We write primarily for the parties and therefore will only set forth those facts that are 
helpful to our brief discussion of the issues. 
was both procedurally sound and substantively reasonable.  United States v. Wise, 515 
F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008). 
II. ANALYSIS   
 A.  Hopson’s Fifth Amendment Right Not to Testify 
 Hopson contends that the district court instructed the jury that it could consider his 
decision not to testify as evidence of guilt, and that these instructions constituted re
error.  The district court defined the phrase “intent to distribute,” and explained that a jury 
“may infer a defendant’s intent from all of the surrounding circumstances,” including “a
statements made or omitted by the Defendant.”  Hopsons’s counsel objected to this
portion of the district court’s instruction and argued that it violated the Fifth Amendmen
right against self-incrimination.  The district court overruled the objection.    
 Hopso
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n’s argument is undermined by the fact that the district court explicitly 
struc
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reviously approved jury instructions similar to the one used 
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in ted the jury that “the defendant had an absolute right not to testify or offer 
evidence.”  The court also explained that the government had the burden to prove
defendant guilty, and that the law never imposed on a defendant in a criminal case the 
burden of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.  The court emphasized tha
defendant’s decision not to testify or offer any evidence should not be considered or 
discussed in deliberations.   
 In addition, we have p
h ee United States v. Garrett, 574 F.2d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 1978). Accordingly, we 
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury as it di
 B.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 Next, Hopson argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction 
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e must determine if, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
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fo unts I and II (distribution of heroin).  He rests that argument on the fact that there 
were no witnesses to the buys, no tape recordings, video recordings or photographs of the
buys, and that the heroin found had no fingerprints or other evidence connecting Hopson to 
the illegal drugs.   
 Accordingly, w
fa ble to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979).  However, “[t]he prosecution may bear this burden entirely through circumstantial 
evidence.”  United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 2006).  Here,
circumstantial evidence is more than sufficient to support the verdict.   
 Hopson lived in a house that was equipped to package and distribute heroin
W ses testified in detail about the interactions between Hopson and Loren Brimage
confidential informant.  Police observed Brimage entering Hopson’s home without any 
heroin on him and leaving with bricks of heroin.  Police also saw Brimage enter Hopson
house with “buy money” and leave shortly thereafter without the money.  In addition
police discovered several items of drug paraphernalia in Hopson’s home, including 
stamped bags, face masks, latex gloves, and a digital scale that contained tan residue
consistent with the appearance of the heroin found in the stamped bags.  Finally, when th
police arrested Hopson, he asked “who set me up?”  This evidence is clearly sufficient to 
establish that Hopson was distributing heroin out of his home.   
 C.  Unavailability of Confidential Informant 
 Hopson complains that Brimage, the government informant, was the only witness to 
e alle
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pson 
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gainst a defendant who has no opportunity to cross examine the 
eclar uate 
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 at trial.  Moreover, 
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 sentencing 
im to nts out that the district court 
jecte
th ged buys and yet he did not testify at trial because the government claimed it was 
unable to locate him.  In the absence of Brimage, the government presented the testimon
of law enforcement officials to whom Brimage told about the buys from Hopson.  Ho
asserts that the effect of this testimony was to allow Brimage to testify without actua
being present at trial, thus violating the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.   
 The Confrontation Clause is violated when hearsay evidence is admitted as 
substantive evidence a
d ant or when the hearsay statement of an unavailable witness does not bear adeq
indicia of reliability.  Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987).  However, “[n]ot a
hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns.”  Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 51 (2004).  Rather, the admission of the declarant’s testimony does not violate the 
Constitution unless it is “testimonial hearsay.”  Id. at 53.   
 Here, Brimage did not appear at trial and his audio recordings were not played.  
Thus, no out of court statement by Brimage was ever presented
H n had every opportunity to cross examine the law enforcement officers who testifie
at trial about what they saw outside of Hopson’s home, as well as in their encounter
Brimage.  We find no Confrontation Clause violation here. 
 D.  Whether Hopson’s Sentence Was Reasonable 
 Finally, Hopson contends that the district court abused its discretion in
h a term of imprisonment of 105 months.  Hopson poi
re d the government’s characterization that he was a career offender, yet then varied 
upward based upon career offender factors.  Hopson claims that because he was not a 
career offender, the district court should have sentenced him to a range of 33 to 41 months
 Our appellate review proceeds in two stages. It begins by “ensur[ing] that the 
district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (o
improper
. 
r 
ly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing 
 con s, or 
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 two, 
n 
 
t the § 
erence to the District Court because it is in the best position to determine the 
pprop nited States v. 
to sider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous fact
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence – including an explanation for any 
deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007
We do not presume that a district court considered the factors solely because the sentence
falls within the Guidelines range.  United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329-30 (3d Cir.
2006).  If a district court has not committed any procedural error,  “we then, at stage
consider its substantive reasonableness.”  United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 
(3d Cir. 2008). Our substantive review requires us not to focus on one or two factors, but o
the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597; United States v. Howe, 543 F.3d 
128, 137 (3d Cir. 2008).  At both stages of our review, the party challenging the sentence
has the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness.  Cooper, 437 F.3d at 332.   
 Where, as here, a district court decides to vary from the Guidelines’ 
recommendations, we “must give due deference to the district court’s decision tha
3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.”  Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597.   
“We afford def
a riate sentence in light of the particular circumstances of the case.”  U
Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 Here, the district court found that Hopson’s criminal history demonstrated that he 
was someone who “consistently violates” society’s laws.  The court pointed out that 
Hopson had four prior serious drug offenses (noting that one of them was too old to count
against him under the guidelines). The court observed t
 
hat the three drug trafficking crimes 
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fo ich he was sentenced had been counted as a single sentence rather than separately 
because the offenses were not separated by intervening arrests, even though the three c
involved completely separate crimes.  The court pointed out that had Hopson been 
arrested rather than showing up on his own pursuant to a summons, he would have 
qualified as a career offender.  The court also noted that Hopson committed a stalking
offense just months after he was released from serving most of a serious 3 to 6 year 
sentence of imprisonment for his three other prior drug trafficking crimes.  The cour
reasoned that if a six year sentence did so little to deter Hopson’s criminal activities, a 3
41 month sentence would have little to no impact.  Accordingly, the district court imposed 
a lengthy sentence because of its concern that Hopson had demonstrated his proclivity fo
recidivism.  We can find nothing unreasonable about the sentence that was imposed and 
the court did not commit any legal error in imposing it.  
III. CONCLUSION. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and 
sentence.   
  
